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Secular Faith: Beyond Postmodern 
Reason and Religious Belief
A. Kiarina Kordela
Although a central topic of both my research and teaching for 
some time now has been the relation between secular reason and (irra-
tional) belief, it was through my participation in the Faculty Develop-
ment International Seminar (FDIS) in Turkey that for the first time I 
realized the connection between my work and specifically religious 
belief. Having always approached the question from a secularist, athe-
ist position, I had always addressed faith as the unconscious belief 
in some unstated a priori law, presupposed for our conscious knowl-
edge to make sense. But I had never seen any connection between this 
mechanism marking secular, and particularly postmodern, thought 
and the postmodern phenomenon many call the revival of religious 
fundamentalism. My experience in Turkey, therefore, helped me grasp 
a phenomenon much broader than Turkish issues themselves, encom-
passing the overall relation between postmodern Western thought and 
the present position of Islam.
Ironically, it was through the implicit presuppositions of the Turk-
ish secularist criticism of Islam as a political force, presented during 
our seminar, that I came to better understand the latter’s importance 
as a historical and political function in the present global world order. 
Consequently, it is both to the constituencies at Macalester College 
that allow for and support the existence of the FDIS and to the Turkish 
secularists that my gratitude goes for having made me understand the 
extent to which Islam, for better or worse, currently is part of our own 
secular and capitalist world, rather than its other.
A Kiarina Kordela
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*****
I shall begin by focusing on a secularist Turkish writer’s account of 
the dynamics of power and religion in Turkey since the 1980s, as they 
reflect themselves in party politics. In her seminar paper and essay 
in this volume, “Secularism and Islam: The Building of Modern Tur-
key,” Binnaz Toprak explains how in the aftermath of “the 1980 mili-
tary coup” in Turkey, which “was staged largely against the growing 
power of the Left in the 1970s…the decline of the Left [was] one of 
the most important factors in the rise of the Welfare Party to power.” 
Unlike the Left, Toprak continues, “the Welfare Party was successful 
because it had learned the first lesson of democracy, namely, to answer 
the demands and interests of the electorate.” The demands and inter-
ests in question “ranged from finding jobs, hospital beds…and attend-
ing weddings to distributing free food and fuel” as “the poor became 
poorer” because of the 1980s “cut down” of “state subsidies.” Through 
“volunteers” among “devout Muslims” as well as “domestic and inter-
national Muslim capital,” the Welfare Party “was able to integrate peo-
ple who had been thus far marginalized by the secularist elite.” Thus, 
Toprak concludes, “in sum, the success of the Welfare Party had less to 
do with its image as an Islamist party than with its activities in deliver-
ing material goods”—activities that before the 1980 coup would have 
been considered part of a Left-oriented political agenda.
In addition to the “first lesson of democracy,” the Welfare leader-
ship had learned the second lesson, namely, that it should “be engaged 
in ‘normal’ politics, business as usual so to speak,” and “to attribute 
to the Party a responsible position on the Center-Right.” On the other 
hand, however, the Party “had acquired a following precisely because 
[it] was more radical on the issue of Islam than the parties of the Cen-
ter-Right.” As a result, the Party eventually proved “unable to play this 
dual role,” as “the more the Party was criticized for its discourse on 
Islam, the more radical the discourse became.” The apparent conflict 
between the Party’s philo-Leftist activities and philo-Islamic discourse 
raised the concern about “the ‘real’ as opposed to the ‘hidden’ inten-
tions of its leadership,” which “the media and public scrutiny of the 
Party was especially directed at understanding.” Statements such as 
Party leader Erbakan’s, “that his Party would come to power by shed-
ding blood, if necessary, increased the public paranoia” and raised the 
question of “whether the Welfare Party would abide by democratic 
procedures or whether the leadership was hiding its intentions that 
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Muslims consider to be their right in hostile milieus.” Reluctance to 
“abide by democratic procedures” was quickly likened to “the Hitler 
example,” and “the question was being increasingly asked whether a 
democracy should allow political parties that would end up destroy-
ing it.”
“In the end,” specifically “in 1997,” Erbakan was forced to resign…
from his post as prime minister…the Welfare Party was closed by the 
Constitutional Court,” and Erbakan himself “was banned from politi-
cal activity.” Toprak attributes the “major reason behind [the Party 
leadership’s] defeat” to its “failure to understand the consensual nature 
of democracy,” the fact that “it rests on compromise and consensus, 
i.e., on moderate politics.” The broader historical result of this defeat 
was the rapid transformation of “the political arena into a tug-of-war 
between the secularists and the Islamists.”
Let us pause at the year 1997 to note the classification constructed 
by Toprak’s rhetoric in her description and interpretation of Turkish 
politics since 1980. The cardinal opposition is between the “secularists” 
and the “Islamists,” two incompatible and inimical groups, insofar 
as the former stands for “democracy,” defined as the “moderate poli-
tics” of “compromise and consensus,” and the latter for the “right” to 
“shed blood, if necessary” “in hostile milieus,” and consequently as 
the source of “political parties that would end up destroying [democ-
racy].”
Passing now to the Turkish present since the election victory of the 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) in 2002, we see the secularism 
embodied by the JDP as “the success story of Turkish democracy,” and 
far from excluding religious belief in Islam, it is “a guarantor of the 
individual’s right to believe or not to believe in a faith,” just as it is “an 
enthusiastic supporter of Turkey’s entry into the European Union.” 
In other words, although Islam bears within it the seed capable of 
destroying democracy, democracy is a system capable of encompass-
ing Islam within itself. How is this paradox to be solved? Toprak’s 
answer is succinct:
This history of Islamic political parties in Turkey demonstrates that a 
democratic environment provides both the platform for the organiza-
tion of anti-system parties while it forces them to limit their sphere of 
action and to moderate their ideology…a democratic system works best 
to integrate Islamist movements into mainstream politics. The interplay 
of freedom of action and its limits in a democracy has a dynamic of its 
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own which leads potentially radical movements to play by the rules of 
the game.
In other words, Islam can be integrated by democracy insofar as it 
ceases to be bloodthirsty Islam, as defined above, and instead becomes 
one among other “movements” within “mainstream politics” that 
“play by the rules of the game” and have a limited “sphere of action” 
and a “moderate” ideology. Concomitantly, democracy’s great feat is 
its ability to safeguard “mainstream politics” and to integrate any pos-
sible challenge by transforming it into a part of itself—or else to ban 
it as something reminiscent of the “Hitler example.” If, therefore, as 
Toprak argues, the Turkish democracy of the JDP “stands as an exam-
ple to the rest of the Muslim world,” it is because it has finally learned 
its Gramscian lesson and is now aware that its success depends on its 
ability to constitute a hegemonic power. This means both the “eco-
nomically dominant, or potentially dominant, mode of production” 
and the “cultural, moral and ideological leadership over allied and 
subordinate groups”—and, above all, to do so through “consent” and 
“direction” as opposed to “coercion” and “domination.”1 Unmistak-
ably echoing Gramsci, for whom “hegemony is dynamic,” presup-
posing “that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of 
the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised,” Toprak writes 
that the “process” of the Turkish secularist/democratic hegemony over 
Islam “works both ways” insofar as “system parties and power centers 
also learn that there are limits to how much they, in turn, can impose 
the system’s definition of rights and freedoms on substantial numbers 
of people who contest these.”2
As is well known, one such “right” currently negotiated in the Euro-
pean Union (EU), the United States, and the Islamic world (notably 
Turkey) alike is the women’s “freedom” to wear the Muslim scarf. 
Asked about her position on this question, Toprak saw no conflict 
between, on the one hand, either the current Turkish legislation grant-
ing the right to wear the scarf within the “private sphere” but prohibit-
ing it within the “public sphere” or the American, French, and other 
European unlimited acceptance of the scarf, and, on the other hand, 
the “rules of democracy’s game.”3 Are the rules of the game different in 
Western than in Islamic democracies? Then followed the relevant ques-
tion of why she regards the public exhibition of the scarf in Turkey 
as threatening—recalling the possible resurrection of an Islam of the 
“shedding blood” type, rather than being associated with its moder-
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ate, mainstreamed counterpart—whereas it is not in the U.S. or certain 
European countries. Toprak concluded that it is because the standards 
of life among the Muslims of the West are higher than those of their 
Turkish counterparts. Thus, we come all the way back to one major, 
yet currently forgotten (if not intentionally and fashionably ignored), 
point of Gramsci, namely, that, as David Forgacs argues:
Hegemony in Gramsci is sometimes interpreted as a relation purely of 
cultural or ideological influence or as a sphere of pure consent… . Yet 
these interpretations seem to be mistaken. Gramsci stresses that ‘though 
hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily 
be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the 
decisive nucleus of economic activity.’4
Our present paradox is this: While in the countries canonically con-
stituting the West, limitations on the use of the scarf would infringe 
upon human rights as defined by the rules of the game but the unlim-
ited use of the scarf within Turkey would amount to a violation of 
the same rules by the Muslims. In the latter case, the presence of the 
scarf represents not simply a cultural right but an economic demand 
(and threat) to the mainstream system of Turkish democracy. Toprak’s 
rhetoric inadvertently shows us (both in accordance with and against 
Gramsci) that what she calls secular “modernity and democracy” is 
a geographically and economically limited space, and that although 
“Turkey has been struggling to integrate itself with the modern world 
for two centuries” and “has achieved much in the process,” neverthe-
less, “its drive toward modernity in terms of both its economic perfor-
mance and its democratic record is far from complete.” Because of the 
persistence of extreme economic disparity between the social classes—
and it is no accident that the Turkish secularists are represented mainly 
by the middle and upper classes—Turkey encounters more problems 
than the core of the West in its attempts to establish a hegemony of the 
democratic rules of the game.
It follows, then, that “the fundamental divide” is not between mod-
ern secular reason and faith in Islam, but, as Slavoj Zizek puts it, “the 
one between those included into the sphere of (relative) economic pros-
perity and those excluded from it.”5 If the conflict of the postmodern 
global capitalist era between “secularists” (Western and others) and 
“Muslims” is increasingly aggravated, this is due to the fact that the 
“present model of late capitalist prosperity,” lobbied under the univer-
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salizing rubric of modern secular democracy, “cannot be universalized.” 
As George Kennan articulated it “with brutal candour more than half a 
century ago,” referring specifically to the U.S.:
We have 50 per cent of the world’s wealth but only 6.3 per cent of its 
population. In this situation, our real job in the coming period…is to 
maintain this position of disparity. To do so, we have to dispense with all 
sentimentality…we should cease thinking about human rights, the rais-
ing of living standards and democratization.6
Commenting on this passage, Zizek writes:
This, then is the truth of the discourse of universal human rights: the Wall 
separating those covered by the umbrella of Human Rights and those excluded 
from its protective cover. Any reference to universal human rights as an 
‘unfinished project’ to be gradually extended to all people is here a vain 
ideological chimera.7
When the JDP acts as “an enthusiastic supporter of Turkey’s entry 
into the European Union,” it effectively endeavors to pass to the other 
side of the “Wall,” since the other major block of countries under the 
said “umbrella,” geographically and politically close to Turkey, is the 
one belonging to the EU. But the desire to enter this side of the Wall, 
far from posing any challenge to the given state of affairs of global 
capitalism and its divide, amounts to the most potent support thereof. 
By entering the EU, Turkey, like any other EU member, would effec-
tively seal the contract to contribute to the flourishing of the European 
economy as an economic competitor and countervailing power to the 
U.S. and other major capitalist powers, such as China and Japan. And 
critically, this would occur within the arena of capitalist economy and 
according to its rules. Consequently, any objection to this plan, whether 
or not initiated by Muslims, expresses opposition to the present state 
of the global economy and its divides. On the other side, the response 
to this reluctance through the invocation of democratic values and 
human rights is nothing other than a concealed and cynical attempt 
to maintain (or obtain) a privileged position within the divides of the 
global world order. It is this realization that leads Zizek to pose the 
question: “faced with this project, do we, in the West, have any right to 
condemn the excluded when they use any means, inclusive of terror, 
to fight their exclusion?”8 The least we could do, when we defend our-
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selves against the violence of the excluded, would be to justify our acts 
in the terms of Kennan’s candour.
One may argue that the present Islamic hostility against the West 
expresses a politically rational position that opposes itself to the state 
of global capitalism and its divide, rather than being the manifestation 
of irrational religious fundamentalism. Yet why does political opposi-
tion today, during postmodern capitalism, need to express itself in reli-
gious terms, rather than, say, in terms of a purely politically informed 
and oriented movement, as the Left used to do up until the collapse 
of the Eastern Bloc? I am not posing the obvious question of why the 
Left lost its credibility as an oppositional movement to capitalism. 
We know the answer. It is due to the fiasco of communism. This line 
of interrogation misses the point, however, since political opposition 
could, in the aftermath of 1989, still constitute itself in terms other than 
those of the Left. It could speak in purely secular, rational, and politi-
cal terms, unalloyed by elements that do not meet the recognition and 
acceptance of secular and enlightened reason as legitimate political 
constituents (such as religion).
Rather, I pose the question in terms of subject constitution and 
self-representation. Why does a Turk, a Kurd, or any subject of an 
“excluded” nationality or ethnicity need to identify as a member of a 
religious faith in order to experience himself or herself as opposing the 
present political and economic world order? Why has the invocation of 
faith, as opposed to reason, become a possible—if not necessary—vehi-
cle towards political opposition?
To respond to this question, I examine the mutations of secular his-
torical time in postmodernism, which allow (if not require) faith, as 
reason’s other, to make its entry onto the political stage.
*****
The fundamental paradox underlying secular reason may be suc-
cinctly expressed through the ambivalence of the concept arbitrari-
ness. This means that secular, increasingly democratic authority always 
rests on precarious internal opposition. On the one hand, authority 
appropriates the absolute right to arbitrate. On the other, there exists 
the arbitrariness through which (since the collapse of aristocracy and 
the emergence of democracy) any given group finds itself occupying 
the position of authority.9 The arbitrariness of secular authority goes 
hand in hand with the arbitrariness of history. It, too, unfolds between 
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and draws on two extremes. On the one hand, there is the arbitrary, 
tautologically posed yet absolute law governing history, which effec-
tively presupposes the exclusion of contingent historical experience. 
Even when the latter is taken into account, it is interpreted only as a 
“symptom” of the law; that is, as something not contingent but required 
by the law. This conception culminates in the model of Hegel’s noto-
rious “Spirit of History” or “Idea.” On the other hand, there is the 
arbitrariness of a history that does not constitute a determined totality 
insofar as it is not governed by any absolute law preventing anything 
from happening. This conception of history finds a range of expres-
sions, from the extreme idealist Fichtean solipsism, in which the ‘I’ 
posits itself and history ex nihilo, to the moderate Marxian premise 
that “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please…[or] under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the 
past.”10
The crucial point for our interrogation is that this paradox of author-
ity and history, as Immanuel Kant showed during the heart of the 
Enlightenment, marks all secular reason. Less tolerant of ambivalence 
than we postmoderns, Kant named the phenomenon the “antinomy” 
or even the “euthanasia of pure reason.”11 Reason “falls of itself and 
even unavoidably,” Kant argues. Contrary to the understanding, which 
“refers to experience so far as it can be given,” it aims at the “absolute 
totality of all possible experience [which] is itself not experience” but a 
“transcendent” concept.12 When I think of experience or history beyond 
what is actually given to my perception at the moment at which I am 
thinking, I’ve stepped out of the realm of understanding and entered 
the kingdom of reason, where I am staring at the transcendent “totality 
of all possible experience.” The notion of change in history, not being 
given to my immediate experience, is therefore such a transcendent 
object, and reason could unambivalently know and represent an immi-
nent change (or the impossibility thereof) only if it also unambivalently 
knew and represented the “totality of all possible experience.”
This totality, however, fails to constitute itself, Kant tells us, in two 
regards: in the way of the dynamic antinomy, with regard to causal-
ity (e.g., the cause of everything in the world); and in the way of the 
mathematical antinomy, with regard to extension (e.g., the limits of the 
world).
With regard to causality, reason can prove two contradictory state-
ments to be true: the thesis that “causality in accordance with laws 
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of nature is not the only causality…it is necessary to assume that 
there is also…freedom;” and the antithesis that “there is no freedom; 
everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of 
nature.”13 In truth, however, Kant argues that there is no antinomy 
here, for “if natural necessity is merely referred to appearances and 
freedom merely to things in themselves” (the latter being also tran-
scendent objects insofar as they escape our experience and cognition), 
then “no contradiction arises if we at the same time assume or admit 
both kinds of causality…to one and the very same thing, but in differ-
ent relations—on one side as an appearance, on the other as a thing in 
itself.”14
Before proceeding to the next antinomy, let me note that the 
dynamic antinomy became the cornerstone of Kant’s political philoso-
phy, grounding “civil society” in “freedom” and “obedience,” as the 
double cause or law determining the actions of all enlightened citizens. 
Unconditional obedience and absolute freedom are addressed to the 
very same subjects, but in different relations: on one side, as “members 
of the community,” where “argument is certainly not allowed—one 
must obey;” and, on the other side, “as a member of the whole com-
munity or of a society of world citizens,” where one “certainly can 
argue without hurting the affairs for which he is in part responsible as 
a passive member.”15 Just as the freedom of the transcendent things in 
themselves guarantees the natural necessity of these same things qua 
appearances, in civil society, too, the exclusion of freedom from the 
concrete “community” into the transcendent space of the “whole com-
munity” of “world citizens” postulates absolute obedience as the sole 
cause within civil society. Thus, there is no contradiction in the impera-
tive: “Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!” 
Or, as Frederic II put it more aptly: “Let them reason all they want to as 
long as they obey.”16 Ever since Kant, this is arguably the basic rule of 
the democratic game.
In abstract terms, the dynamic antinomy is the failure of reason pre-
supposed for an unconditional law to impose itself on a totality, which 
is always heterogeneous, insofar as it presupposes as its exception a 
transcendent realm (e.g., that of “world citizens”) where this law has 
no validity. We could therefore formulate the dynamic antinomy as 
follows: Everything is subject to the law x, under the precondition that 
there is something that is not subject to this x.
Turning now to the mathematical antinomy regarding the world’s 
extension, reason offers two answers: the thesis that “the world has a 
A Kiarina Kordela
219
beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space” and the antithe-
sis that “the world has no beginning, and no limits.”17 Both statements, 
however, are false insofar as the categories of time and space pertain 
only to appearances and not to things in themselves: “space and time, 
together with the appearances in them” are “nothing existing in them-
selves and outside of my representations.”18 The world can be said to 
be infinite or finite only qua appearance, not in itself. While we think 
that we are considering the world, in effect we are asking a self-refer-
ential epistemological question about the limits of “the series of condi-
tions for given appearances,” having as our referent our knowledge of 
the world rather than the world itself.19 Hence, “enclosed in bound-
aries” or “infinite with regard to both time and space” is the series 
of conditions required for our knowledge of the world, and not the 
world itself, which cannot form a totality, whether infinite or finite.20 
Consequently, “I cannot say the world is infinite…nor…that it is finite,” 
instead, “I will be able to say…only something about the…magnitude 
(of experience)”—not the magnitude of the world, which may or may 
not coincide with that of our experience.21
Since the object of the mathematical antinomy turns out to be cog-
nition itself, it forms a homogeneous realm coextensive with spatio-
temporality, and with no transcendent exception. Rather than posing 
transcendence as a distinct and delineated exception, this antinomy 
raises the unanswerable question of whether the world in itself coin-
cides with that of our cognition or whether it also exists outside and 
independently of our experience thereof.
It follows that the mathematical antinomy provides us with “a regu-
lative principle of reason” itself, as opposed to a “constitutive cosmo-
logical principle…of the absolute totality of the series of conditions, as 
given in itself in the object.” Consequently, to mistake the magnitude 
of our experience for that of the world in itself amounts to “the sub-
scription of objective reality to an idea that merely serves as a rule” of 
reason.22 What escaped Kant was the fact that the complete rule of rea-
son derives from both ways in which reason fails, the dynamic and the 
mathematical. In the antinomies of reason, Kant effectively discovered 
the paradox that thought operates within two temporalities: logical and 
linear time, or synchrony and diachrony.
When we examine causality, we operate within a synchronic time, 
in which, appearances to the contrary, a logical loop renders cause 
and effect simultaneous. Kenneth Burke explains this paradox suc-
cinctly: “Though there is a sense in which a Father precedes a Son, 
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there is also a sense in which the two states are ‘simultaneous’—for 
parents can be parents only insofar as they have offspring, and in this 
sense the offspring ‘makes’ the parent.”23 The same is true of historical 
causality. The failure of the 1848 German peasant revolution, the late 
constitution of the German nation-state in 1871, the German defeat in 
WWI—all these events can be said to have contributed to the emer-
gence of the Nazi phenomenon only after the latter has occurred. But 
the moment they are identified as causes of the said phenomenon, a 
hypothesis has freely been presupposed and posed as the absolute law 
determining this causal series of events; namely, that a country’s fail-
ure to keep up with the modern European development toward what 
Kojin Karatani calls the triad of “capital, state, and nation” is doomed 
to result in a monstrosity of the Nazi type.24 Only this arbitrary (=abso-
lute) presupposition allows for the causal linkage between these oth-
erwise contingent events, just as its arbitrariness (=freedom) is evident 
in the fact that Nazism can also be reduced to other causes, as is the 
case in those historical interpretations in which capitalism is deemed 
the cause, or in Horkheimer and Adorno’s interpretation in which the 
entire march of history, since the time of tribes, magic, and mythology, 
is doomed to find its fulfillment in Nazism. In short, logical time, in 
properly dynamic fashion, always presupposes a transcendent “free” 
(and hence ideological) positing of a presupposition without which the 
law of causality established within phenomena would not apply.
By contrast, when we examine extension, we operate within linear 
time and consider everything in its diachronic succession. Thus, when 
confronted with the question about the limits of the world, since we 
cannot empirically know them, we are forced to admit the infinite 
regress in the series of our experience of the world, and to be unable to 
constitute the totality of the world, since there is no arbitrary presup-
position that we can pose in this matter. Hence, the complete “rule of 
reason” consists in reason’s ability to perform both operations, the syn-
chronic and the diachronic.
It was structural linguistics in the era of Modernism that drew atten-
tion to this paradox or “rule of reason.” As Joan Copjec puts it, Kant’s 
regulative “rule of reason” is the “rule of language” or of the “signi-
fier,” which is a “genuine contradiction” insofar as “it enjoins us not 
only to believe,” in our diachronic mode, “that there will always be 
another signifier to determine retroactively the meaning of all that 
have come before”—or, in more explicitly Kantian terms, to believe 
that there will always be another condition in the regress of the series 
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of conditioned—but “it also requires us to presuppose,” in our syn-
chronic mode, “ ‘all the other signifiers,’ the total milieu that is neces-
sary for the meaning of one,” as “the simultaneity” or totality of all 
signifiers or “phenomena.”25 In short, the rule of reason is the postu-
late of an infinite regress in the diachrony of signifiers antinomically 
coupled with the demand for the synchronic totality of all signifiers, 
which, however, cannot be formed but through the arbitrary (=free) 
positing of an exception.
Approximately half a century before structuralism, Marx had iden-
tified the same paradox in capitalist economy, as the governing rule, 
not of reason but of exchange-value. This postulates, on the one hand, 
that “the relative expression of value of the commodity is incom-
plete, because the series of its representations never comes to an end,” 
regressing to infinity—since there are “innumerable other members of 
the world of commodities,” including ever new ones. But, on the other 
hand, Marx’s rule of exchange-value also indicates that “the general 
form of value…can only arise as the joint contribution of the whole 
world of commodities,” since “a commodity only acquires a general 
expression of its value if, at the same time, all other commodities 
express their values in the same equivalent.”26 For the totality of the 
field of exchange-value to form itself, one commodity (money) must 
form the exception against which the exchange-value of any other 
commodity can be directly measured, without comparison to all other 
(indefinitely many) commodities. The rule of secular reason or of the signi-
fier and the rule of exchange-value coincide.
Crucially, however, the truth underlying and allowing for the antin-
omy of the rule of exchange-value or of reason is that of set theory, a 
theory that escaped Kant but not Marx. Examined from the perspective 
of set theory, the obstacle preventing a set from forming a totality is not 
the infinite regression in the diachronic series of its elements but the 
self-referentiality of its synchronic totality. In set theory, the set of all sets 
is defined as not-all (i.e., as not constituting a totality), not because we 
perpetually encounter yet another set, but because it cannot be decided 
whether it itself (the set of all sets) is included as a member of itself 
or not. Foregrounding the set theory in Marx, Kojin Karatani writes 
that, just as “Cantor…treated infinity as a number” whereby the set 
of all numbers (infinity) became a member of itself, and hence not-all, 
Marx, too, “by treating capital itself, and therefore money itself, as a 
commodity…identifies a paradox in which a class of the meta-level 
descends to the object level to occupy the same locus as the members; 
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in other words, to become a member of itself,” whereby capitalism 
becomes a not-all, “deconstructive” system with no “transcendental 
center.”27 In Marx’s words, if “gold confronts the other commodities 
as money [it is] only because it previously confronted them as a com-
modity,” and nothing could have “won a monopoly” as the “universal 
equivalent” if it itself, “like all other commodities,” had not “also func-
tioned as an equivalent.”28 To ground his point, Marx offers examples 
of societies in which gold, furs, and other commodities/objects of util-
ity were used as money. But in late capitalism, we do not need such 
examples, as we know that even paper money occupies “exclusively 
the position of the equivalent form” while remaining a commodity 
sold by credit companies. By contrast, the classical economists whom 
Marx criticized had conceived of money in properly “dynamic” fash-
ion as a “barometer,” an exception that is not itself a member of the 
world of commodities.29 The antinomy or rule of exchange-value and 
of reason, therefore, emerges out of capital’s and reason’s failure to rep-
resent—what Kant called the “thing in itself,” which turns out to be not 
a positively given entity beyond the field of representation—their own 
self-referentiality.30 Yet, self-referential not-all sets abound in secular 
capitalist modernity. Beyond economy and all fields of representation, 
they comprise subjectivity itself.31
Here enters psychoanalysis. Since the failure of reason or represen-
tation always indexes the real (that which cannot be represented), psy-
choanalysis redefined the rule of reason or of exchange-value as the 
rule of sexual difference—sex being understood as distinct from gen-
der or any other representable identity of the subject. Sex qua real is the 
failure to represent the subject as a self-referential not-all set, in which 
the ‘I’ (ego) is both the set of all sets (and hence in control of them) 
and a member of itself (as the de-centered or “deconstructed” ego of 
the subject of the unconscious). Having labeled totality, with regard 
to sexuality, as the “phallic function [F],” Jacques Lacan argued that 
the dynamic and mathematic failures to represent the self-referential-
ity of this function constitute the male and female sexes, respectively. 
The male totality or “man as whole acquires his inscription (prend 
son inscription), with the proviso that this function [F] is limited due 
to the existence of an x by which the function Fx is negated (niée).”32 
To return to Kant’s political philosophy via Copjec, the (male) public 
sphere of law and obedience forms an all through the “prohibition: do 
not include freedom in your all.”33 On the other side, Lacan continues, 
the female sex does “not allow for any universality,” it remains “a not-
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whole, insofar as it has the choice of positing itself in Fx or of not being 
there (de n’en pas être).”34
Applied to history, self-referentiality indicates that (like money) any 
Master-Signifier (say, liberalism or communism) will always already 
have been the cause and end of history, if and when it occurs—and 
until then, it is nothing but one Master-Signifier (commodity) among 
others. Sexual difference indicates that any subject or group of subjects 
can relate to this radical self-referentiality of the Master-Signifier—the 
fact that the end of history depends on historical contingency itself—in 
one of two ways. The male way copes with it by turning this contin-
gent end into an eternal “transcendental center.” We always already 
live in communism without knowing it; hence, because communism 
(will always already have) occurred, we are already doing something 
(which would be justifiable only if communism had indeed occurred). 
Thus, the male failure of reason involves a short circuit between pres-
ent and future, eliminating their distinction.
By contrast, the female way misrepresents self-referentiality as an 
infinite regress with no “transcendental center.” Communism would 
have occurred, if it were the end of history, but history has no end, or, 
what amounts to the same thing, any end is the end of history.
Appearances to the contrary, both sexes can contribute to the suste-
nance of the status quo. The male failure can propel the self-referential-
ity of the Master-Signifier—x will always already have been the cause 
of y, if and when y will have occurred—to deteriorate into the inverted 
and perverted logic of totalitarianism. In other words, because y is (or 
will necessarily occur), we are already doing x now. And the female 
failure can infer that, if any end is equally legitimate, then any action 
is legitimate insofar as it can justify itself through some end. Thus, the 
female failure can arrive at the fatalistic justification of anything that is 
and the rejection of anything that is not as idealism, if not authoritari-
anism. Thereby, human desire and intentionality become the hubris of 
intervening into history in order to determine or alter its will, to make 
of history what it is not.
While canonically associated with essentialism and deconstruction, 
respectively, the male and females modes of reasoning (or, rather, of 
failing to do so) are more recognizable today in the West as the osten-
sible opposition between the Right and the Left. Their respective log-
ics or sexes have become particularly transparent since September 11 
and the U.S. reactions to it. Ever since, as Slavoj Zizek puts it, “the 
official American ‘philosophy’ of international politics,” as expressed 
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in “ ‘The National Security Strategy,’ ” is based on the premise that the 
“loop between the present and the future is closed.”35 As an example, 
Zizek cites “the actor and ex-Congressman Fred Thompson,” who in 
2002 argued, “in defense of President Bush’s Iraq politics,” as follows: 
“When anti-war protesters say ‘But what did Iraq effectively DO to the 
U.S.? It did not attack us!’ one should answer it with the question ‘And 
what did the terrorists who destroyed the Twin Towers effectively DO 
to the U.S. before September 11? They also did nothing!’ ” Thompson’s 
argumentation “presupposes that we can treat the future as something 
that, in a sense, already took place.”36
On the other hand, the American and European Left is convinced 
both that there is no proof of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and 
that whatever actions the U.S. might be taking, they are, if not desir-
able, inevitable, insofar as capitalism and its world order are here to 
stay—the end of history being not the same as its own will, which is 
expressed in what is. This conviction is manifest in the Left’s passive 
reaction to U.S. politics after September 11. As Zizek remarks, after 
“the war in Afghanistan, the plans for an attack on Iraq, the new explo-
sion of violence in Palestine: each time, there were muffled voices 
of discontent in Europe which raised particular points, and calls for 
a more balanced approach,” because of which “the big story in the 
media was the rise of Anti-American Schadenfreude and the lack of sim-
ple human sympathy with American suffering among the European 
intelligentsia.”37 “The true story, however,” as Zizek argues, “is exactly 
the opposite one: the total lack of an autonomous European political 
initiative,” the fact that “Europe…took the path of ‘unconditional com-
promise,’ giving in to U.S. pressure,” that “there was no formal resis-
tance, no imposition of a different global perception of the crisis,” and 
that “no official European institution risked a friendly but clear distan-
tiation from the American position.”38 Consequently, he explains:
these voices of protest died away—they were literally of no consequence, 
mere empty gestures whose function was to enable us, Europeans, to say 
to ourselves: ‘You see, we did protest, we did our duty!,’ while silently 
endorsing the fait accompli of American politics.39
Although the circumstances are ripe and “Europe is in an ideal posi-
tion to start such an initiative” in which it would “distance itself clearly 
from the American hegemony,” and “the Left” could and “should 
unashamedly appropriate the slogan of a unified Europe as a counter-
A Kiarina Kordela
225
weight to Americanized globalism,” what actually happened instead, 
Zizek continues, was “the real politico-ideological catastrophe of Sep-
tember 11…an unprecedented strengthening of American hegemony, 
in all its aspects,” whereby “Europe succumbed to a kind of ideologico-
political blackmail by the U.S.A.: ‘What is now at stake are no longer 
different economical or political choices, but our very survival—in the 
war of terrorism, you are either with us or against us.’ ”40
It is in this “reference to mere survival” that we encounter the tran-
scendental free presupposition or “ultimate legitimization” of U.S. pol-
itics and hegemony, “a certain positive” and absolute “vision of global 
political relations,” which “is silently imposed [also] on…Europeans,” 
and which we can call as much our arbitrarily posed Master-Signifier 
as “political ideology at its purest.”41 For, if our survival is possible 
only insofar as we are “with” the “us” of the U.S., then the survival in 
question is that of “American hegemony,” the Master-Signifier presup-
posed for the present American course of political action to appear 
as both legitimate and necessary. It is because this hegemony has in 
postmodernism become the premise of any action that would permit 
us to “survive” that the Left can only impotently watch the course of 
events, incapable of forming a front of opposition. The trauma of secu-
lar, specifically postmodern, reason since “the collapse of socialism” 
lies in the fact that, to cite again Zizek’s words, “we are again accepting 
the notion of history as fate,” so that whereas in the past the “idea was 
that life would somehow go on on earth, but that there are different 
possibilities,” now it is “much easier for us to imagine the end of the 
world than a small change in the political system.” The postmodern 
motto, expressing the Left and the Right alike, is, therefore: “Life on 
earth maybe will end, but somehow capitalism will go on.”42 If both 
Right and Left operate by starting from the same premise (“capitalism 
will go on”), then the entirety of secular reason exhausts itself within 
a politics that cannot oppose American hegemony. Hence, in postmod-
ernism, opposition is conceivable only from the perspective of non-
reason: faith.
This is also to say that faith is the repressed underside or presup-
posed cause/effect of postmodern reason. Generally, opposition to a 
system does not come ex nihilo; it comes from the system itself. The 
problem is that when it happens to come from the system’s own 
repressed underside, appearances to the contrary, it effectively sus-
tains rather than challenges the system. This was historically proven 
through so-called communism. Reserving the term communism for an 
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ideal that has never been historically realized, Guattari and Negri refer 
to the “ex-existing” communism as socialism. They describe the world 
prior to 1989 as follows: “Forget capitalism and socialism…Instead we 
have in place one vast machine, extending over the planet an enslave-
ment of all mankind,” which imposes a “regimentation of thought 
and desire which terminates the individual.”43 Capitalism does so by 
subjecting everything to the law of the accumulation of capital, that 
is, the law of surplus-value, which presupposes the transformation of 
everything into a commodity qua exchange-value. Socialism, by con-
trast, does so by subjecting everything to the law of need, that is, the 
total elimination of surplus-value and the transformation of everything 
into a commodity qua use-value. But each is simply the precondition of 
the other, just as use- and exchange-values are one another’s precondi-
tion. Thus, the historical function of socialism, from its inception to its 
collapse and beyond, has been the sustenance of capitalism.
And the same is true of the relation between postmodern reason 
and faith insofar as they are one another’s precondition. Reason can 
deconstruct beliefs and truths only insofar as they are there, just as one 
can have faith in something only insofar as it transcends what one can 
know through one’s reason.44 To put it in Guattari and Negri’s terms, 
which make more explicit the connection between the reason and the 
economy of the same historical period, postmodern capitalism: “And 
what would such references to rationality signify anyway, in a world 
in which functionalism is strictly geared toward Capital, which in itself 
constitutes a maximization of irrationality?”—a faith in God-Capital.45 
If faith is presently monopolized by religion, this is so because post-
modern reason represses it, that is, excludes it from its self-representa-
tions.
In other words, this essay attempts to explain why religious faith 
assumes its present political function but it is not a call to assume that 
religious belief is the effective opposition to the present system of capi-
talist hegemony.
*****
As Lacanians have often pointed out, the freedom of the subject—i.e., 
its ability to transcend the determinism of its self-representations—lies 
precisely in its sex: the fact that representation fails to represent the 
thing in itself, or, in other words, that representation is self-referen-
tial.46 In terms of history, the subject is free precisely because there 
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is no pre-fixed end of history, since the end of history is constituted 
retroactively through its contingent events. To be sure, the same failure 
that guarantees the subject’s freedom is that which also allows for what 
is known as ideological interpellation. If people can believe in one or 
another historical cause it is precisely because the Master-Signifier is 
posited arbitrarily.
Today, however, we in the West are experiencing a reduction of both 
ideological plurality and sexual difference to the fatalism of the inevi-
tability of capitalism as both the end of history (and, hence, the state 
sub specie aeternitatis) and as the thing in itself, which now psychoti-
cally coincides with representation. The world (and its survival) coin-
cides with its given appearance (American capitalist hegemony). In 
late capitalism, consequently, there is space neither for the real (which 
is perhaps why postmodern art obsesses with it) nor for sex (which is 
perhaps why mainstream culture obsesses with it). As Lacan once put 
it, “That’s simply capitalism set straight…since anyway capitalism, that 
was its starting point: getting rid of sex.”47 Thus, given that postmod-
ern reason and global capital have eventually gotten rid of sex and the 
real, not only does political opposition presently emerge as religious 
opposition (i.e., as non-secular reason) but, in the usual mirage of 
projection, it is religious opposition that is perceived as psychotically 
fanatic—reminiscent of the Hitler example that does not abide by the 
rules of the game of democracy (i.e., of the present global hegemony).
In other words, if we do not want change to be fully appropriated 
by religious faith (and, hence, to be fully reduced to something that 
sustains the system rather than effecting a genuine change), then we 
have to make secular reason once again capable of seeing the possibil-
ity of change—something which, above all, presupposes the ability 
of reason to see the present state of capitalism as one among other 
historical moments, rather than as our a priori premise and the end of 
history. This, in turn, is possible only if secular reason transcends its 
postmodern moment to acknowledge faith—be it in God-Capital or 
in change—as an integral part of itself. This does not mean a return 
to modernism and essentialism but a step forward, through postmod-
ernism itself, towards the recognition of faith as the unstated presup-
position of postmodern thought. This is properly secular faith. This 
essay, therefore, is rather a call to both the Right and the Left to dare to 
embrace their secular faith. •
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Notes
1. Toprak essay; Gramsci 1985, pp. 104–107; Gramsci 1988, p. 423.
2. Gramsci 1971, p. 159; Toprak.
3. In current Turkish discourse on the subject of the scarf, the terms private and public are 
not used in the usual sense we in the West attribute to them. The Turkish private sphere is 
much larger, including all fields for us canonically belonging to the public sphere except 
cases such as public appearances of politicians or state institutions like the University of 
Bogazici itself. There is also a gray zone, still being negotiated, which includes occasions 
such as politicians’ receptions and other social activities. In other words, any woman can 
wear the scarf in the streets and other public spaces as long as her appearance cannot be 
interpreted as a direct representation of the state and the governing, secularist party.
4. In Gramsci 1988, p. 423; David Forgacs citing Gramsci 1971, p. 160, emphasis mine.
5. Zizek 2002, p. 149.
6. Kennan in 1948, quoted in Pilger, p. 98.
7. Zizek 2002, p. 150.
8. Ibid.
9. Note that this radical ambivalence toward arbitrary authority is a specifically secu-
lar concern insofar as political authority during the theocracy of the Middle Ages was 
grounded on divine authority. In other words, the monarch was the direct representative 
of God on earth, and not somebody arbitrarily elected by humans to rule them. The shift 
from theocracy to the secular centralized modern state and the entailed anxiety vis-à-vis 
the ungroundedness of secular authority is well documented not only in the political 
philosophy of early modernity (e.g., Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Vico) but also in litera-
ture, notably in the Baroque tragic drama.
10. Marx 1998, p. 15.
11. A 407/B p. 434; 1998, p. 460.
12. A 470/B p. 434; 1998, p. 460; §328; 1977, p. 70.
13. B472/A444–B473/A445; 1998, pp. 484–485.
14. §53; 1977, pp. 84–85.
15. Kant 1959, p. 87.
16. As cited in Foucault 1997, p. 34.
17. B454/A426–B455/A427; 1998, pp. 470–471.
18. Kant, §52c; 1977, p. 82.
19. Kant, B454/A426–B455/A427; 1998, pp. 470–471.
20. §52c; 1977, p. 82.
21. A 520/ B 548 and A 523/B 551; 1998, pp. 526, 528.
22. Kant, A 509–510/B537–538; 1998, pp. 520–521.
23. Burke 1970, p. 32.
24. Karatani 2003, p. 203.
25. Copjec 1994, pp. 205, 220.
26. Marx 1990, 155–156, 159.
27. Karatani 1995, pp. 69–70.
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28. Marx 1990, 162–163.
29. Karatani 1995, p. 70.
30. Following a different path, Zizek arrives at the same conclusion in his account of 
the “sublime” (see Zizek 1989, particularly the chapter “The Logic of Sublimity,” pp. 
201–207).
31. The self-referentiality or not-all character of sets is again a purely secular issue inso-
far as it is precisely the absence of a divine ground or guarantee that renders sets not-all. 
The democratic political system, for instance, is self-referential precisely insofar as it is 
the electorate itself (the members of the set supposed to be governed by an exception, the 
president) and not God that makes the president their legitimate governor.
32. Lacan 1998, p. 79.
33. Copjec, p. 235.
34. Lacan 1998, p. 80.
35. Zizek 2003.
36. Ibid.
37. Zizek 2002, p. 143.
38. Ibid., pp. 143–144.
39. Ibid., p. 144.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 145, brackets mine.
42. Zizek, as cited in Mead, p. 40.
43. Guattari and Negri, p. 7.
44. This was one of Søren Kierkegaard’s central themes. See, for instance, “Truth Is Sub-
jectivity,” in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the “Philosophical Fragments” (1846).
45. Guattari and Negri, p. 27.
46. For an extensive elaboration of this argument, see, for instance, Copjec 1994, particu-
larly the chapter “Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason,” pp. 201–236.
47. Lacan 1990, p. 30.
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